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Note 
 
Fundamental Protections for Non-Biological 
Intelligences or: How We Learn to Stop Worrying 
and Love Our Robot Brethren 
Ryan Dowell* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the future, it is possible that humans will create 
machines that are thinking entities with faculties on par with 
humans. Computers are already more capable than humans at 
some tasks,1 but are not regarded as truly intelligent or able to 
think. Yet since the early days of computing, humans have 
contemplated the possibility of intelligent machines—those 
which reach some level of sentience.2 Intelligent machines could 
result from highly active and rapidly advancing fields of 
research, such as attempts to emulate the human brain, or to 
develop generalized artificial intelligence (AGI). If intelligent 
machines are created, it is uncertain whether intelligence would 
emerge through gradual development or a spontaneous 
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University of Kansas, 2013. Thank you to Professors Brian Bix and Francis 
Shen for feedback and guidance on this Note. Thanks to friends and family who 
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 1. See, e.g., Nicola Amoroso et al., Brain Structural Connectivity Atrophy 
in Alzheimer’s Disease, CORNELL U. LIBR. ARXIV (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1709.02369.pdf (discussing the use of a computer to 
identify Alzheimer’s disease from medical imaging); Demis Hassabis, Artificial 
Intelligence: Chess Match of the Century, 544 NATURE 413, 413–14 (2017) 
(discussing the 1997 matchup between chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov and 
IBM’s Deep Blue computer, which won the bout); Charlie Schmidt, M. D. 
Anderson Breaks with IBM Watson, Raising Questions About Artificial 
Intelligence in Oncology, 109 J. NAT’L CANCER INST., May 2017, at 4–5 
(describing how Watson is used to read the large body of medical publications 
and deliver information to doctors). 
 2. See Irving John Good, Speculations Concerning the First 
Ultraintelligent Machine, 6 ADVANCES COMPUTERS 31, 32–33 (1966). 
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emergence. Throughout this Note, such intelligent machines will 
be referred to as non-biological intelligences (NBIs), with 
emphasis on machines with human-analogous intelligence.3 
Protection of NBIs, equivalent to protection of human research 
subjects, should be preemptively implemented to prevent 
injustice and potential grave harm to them. 
In the Introduction, this Note introduces current standards 
by which we define a person, as well as several developing 
technologies that will challenge current definitions. Part I 
examines technologies that may result in non-biological 
intelligences that exhibit human mental capacities. It then 
examines the concept of personhood and its legal ramifications. 
Part II examines how these technologies fit (or don’t) into 
existing legal frameworks and schema. Finally, in Part III, this 
Note proposes preemptive implementation of protections 
analogous to those for research on humans for NBIs, whether 
such an intelligence arises as a replica of human consciousness, 
as a de novo construct, or via unexpected means. Part III also 
touches on some intervening occurrences before the emergence 
of NBIs, which may begin to pave the legal path for more 
advanced technologies. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In this Part, this Note will examine potential NBIs. This 
Part first discusses two impending areas of research—
development of general AI and human brain emulation—which 
appear to be likely origins from which NBIs might emerge. This 
Part will then look at an extreme example: Singularity, a 
theoretical event in which humans create a technology that 
leads to a domino effect of rapidly escalating, self-improving 
                                                          
 3. “Non-biological,” as used here, refers to natural biology and does not 
preclude the involvement of biological elements, such as DNA computing or 
storage. See generally MARTYN AMOS, THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL DNA 
COMPUTATION (2005); George Church et al., Next-Generation Digital 
Information Storage in DNA, 337 SCIENCE 1628 (2012); Seth L. Shipman et al., 
CRISPR–Cas Encoding of a Digital Movie into the Genomes of a Population of 
Living Bacteria, 547 NATURE 345 (2017). Additionally, degree of intelligence is 
more informative than the specific physical form of an NBI. Science fiction can 
be illustrative here, as the genre often glosses over any distinction between 
biological creations and mechanical. See, e.g., BLADE RUNNER at 2:31 (Ladd 
Company 1982) (“[A] CORPORATION advanced robot evolution . . . [by 
creating] being[s] virtually identical to a human . . . . [which] were superior in 
strength and agility, and at least equal in intelligence, to the genetic engineers 
who created them.”). 
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intelligence. It will then outline current legal framework for 
personhood. 
A. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
From the earliest days of computing, AI has been a notable 
waypoint for the field—a tantalizing dream of the future.4 Over 
the past decade, breakthroughs in AI development have driven 
a surge likened to a gold rush.5 Some metrics show AI 
performance growing nearly fifty times over three years to reach 
“superhuman” capabilities.6 AI has accomplished landmark 
feats that had long eluded researchers, and did so years ahead 
of most estimated timelines.7 However, AI development has also 
                                                          
 4. See generally Good, supra note 2, at 31; A.M. Turing, Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433 (1950). Intelligent machines seem to 
have been contemplated—at least in fiction—before computers were invented. 
Compare METROPOLIS (UFA 1927) (involving a human mind that is put into 
humanoid machine), and KAREL ČAPEK, R.U.R., in ČAPEK: FOUR PLAYS 1 (Peter 
Majer & Cathy Porter trans. 1999) (1921) (originating the etymological root of 
the word “robot,” which were synthetic, organic entities in this play), with 
SCOTT MCCARTNEY, ENIAC: THE TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES OF THE WORLD’S 
FIRST COMPUTER (1999) (describing how John Mauchly and Presper Eckert 
began creating one of the first computers—the Electronic Numerical Integrator 
And Computer (ENIAC)—around 1941). 
 5. Rich Foreman, Artificial Intelligence and Startups: The AI Gold Rush, 
IBM (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/information-technology/artificial-
intelligence-and-startups-ai-gold-rush. 
 6. Jensen Huang, Accelerating AI with GPUs: A New Computing Model, 
NVIDIA (Jan. 12, 2016), https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2016/01/12/accelerating-
ai-artificial-intelligence-gpus/ (charting a fifty times increase in Deep Learning 
performance over 2013 through 2015, largely due to GPU-accelerated 
computing: “In 2012, deep learning had beaten human-coded software. By 2015, 
deep learning had achieved ‘superhuman’ levels of perception.”) Note that the 
“superhuman” description concerns capabilities limited to a specific task (i.e. 
narrow AI, rather than AGI). 
 7. See, e.g., AlphaGo, DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/research/alphago/ 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (chronicling the AlphaGo program’s successful 
defeat of human champions in Go, which was “widely viewed as an unsolved 
‘grand challenge’ for artificial intelligence” due to decades of attempts with no 
success); Will Knight, Google’s AI Masters the Game of Go a Decade Earlier than 
Expected, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com 
/s/546066/googles-ai-masters-the-game-of-go-a-decade-earlier-than-expected/. 
Illustrating the breakneck pace of AI developments, a successor to AlphaGo was 
announced during late-round edits to this Note. The new version, AlphaGo Zero, 
utterly defeated the old AlphaGo winning all one hundred matchups. Zero no 
longer requires thousands of human-played game samples—it learned the game 
from merely playing against itself. See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game 
of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 354 (2017); Demis Hassabis & 
David Silver, AlphaGo Zero: Learning from Scratch, DEEPMIND (Oct. 18, 2017),  
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seen many “winters,” when advances and interest in the field 
dwindle.8 Although the hype cycle of AI winter and resurgence 
may continue, this resurgence seems to be particularly strong 
and winter may not be coming.9 
AI is broadly described as either: narrow AI (also referred to 
as “weak” or applied AI), which carries out a function such as 
data processing; or artificial general intelligence (AGI or 
“strong” AI), which is hypothetically capable of “the whole 
domain of human thought.”10 Artificial general intelligence that 
surpasses “the best human brains in practically every field” 
would be considered artificial superintelligence (ASI).11 
Current AIs are almost exclusively narrow AI, built to solve 
particular tasks.12 Projects directed to develop AGI appear to be 
rare, but there are a number of companies in “stealth mode” 
researching AI with little information disclosed to the public.13 
A step further are “stealth companies,” which try to remain 
hidden from public view.14 “Stealth” projects are probably not a 
result of nefarious supervillains, but likely due to market 
pressures, such as rapid deployment of AI into consumer 
products or trade secret protections. 
From HAL9000 to Skynet, popular science fiction provides 
many doomsday scenarios,15 relegating intelligent AI to a mere 
                                                          
https://deepmind.com/blog/alphago-zero-learning-scratch/. The ability to 
develop an AI without large training data sets is a major improvement, which 
alleviates a significant limiting factor for many AI applications. 
 8. NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 
6–8 (2014). 
 9. See Will Knight, AI Winter Isn’t Coming, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec 7, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603062/ai-winter-isnt-coming/ (“[T]here’s 
perhaps been no boom to match the current one.”). 
 10. See Jack Copeland, What is Artificial Intelligence?, ALANTURING.NET 
(May 2000), http://www.alanturing.net/turing_archive/pages/Reference 
%20Articles/what_is_AI/What%20is%20AI02.html. 
 11. Nick Bostrom, How Long Before Superintelligence?, 5 LINGUISTIC & 
PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 11 (2006). Similar to how NBIs are defined in this Note, 
Bostrom provides a flexible approach. Id. at 11 (“This definition leaves open how 
the superintelligence is implemented . . . [and] whether the superintelligence is 
conscious and has subjective experiences.”). 
 12. See Copeland, supra note 10. 
 13. JAMES BARRAT, OUR FINAL INVENTION: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
THE END OF THE HUMAN ERA 39–43 (2013). 
 14. Id. at 39–43. Barrat notes that Google X was a stealth company until 
revealed by the New York Times. Id. at 41–42. 
 15. See, e.g., 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) 
(portraying HAL 9000, a sentient AI, who malfunctions and becomes the film’s 
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boogeyman in popular culture.16 Such trivialization belies the 
concerns of many prominent thinkers. Some notable minds have 
publicly expressed deep concerns over the creation of advanced 
                                                          
villain) (as added trivia for those who read the footnotes, when Dave kills HAL, 
he sings Daisy Bell, referencing that song’s history as the first example of a 
computer “singing” seven years prior to the film’s release. The Sounds of 
Fighting Men, Howlin’ Wolf and Comedy Icon Among 25 Named to the National 
Recording Registry, LIBR. CONGRESS (June 23, 2017), https://www.loc.gov 
/item/prn-10-116/); THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers 1999) (depicting a dystopian 
future, wherein sentient machines use humans as glorified batteries); THE 
TERMINATOR (Hemdale 1984) (involving Skynet, a military AI that becomes 
self-aware and deduces that humans would consequentially attempt to destroy 
it, to which it concludes human extinction is the only means for self-
preservation, which ultimately leads to a stereotypical robot apocalypse and 
time-travelling humanoid assassin bots). But cf., e.g., BIG HERO 6 (Walt Disney 
Pictures 2014) (portraying a robot as the titular sixth hero); INTERSTELLAR 
(Paramount Pictures 2014) (depicting a machine, TARS, as the clichéd heroic 
“sacrifice” that miraculously survives for a happy ending); TERMINATOR 2: 
JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco Pictures 1991) (returning Arnold Schwarzenegger as 
a machine physically identical to the antagonist in the first movie—beyond the 
villain-to-hero role reversal, the machine develops a humanized personality). 
In writing this footnote, it seems that the degree of humanization strongly 
affected my word choice. I think of HAL, TARS, and the second Terminator—
who are given masculine personalities in the films—as “he,” whereas the silent 
villains of The Matrix remain machines are “its.” Skynet lies somewhere 
between these two extremes as a more anthropomorphized “it,” perhaps because 
the underlying motivation is conveyed, but there is no discrete personality 
associated with the intelligence. How we identify and interact with AI and 
fictional NBIs is beyond the scope of this Note, but is certainly interesting food 
for thought. See ISAAC ASIMOV & ROBERT SILVERBERG, THE POSITRONIC MAN 
(1992); BICENTENNIAL MAN (Buena Vista Pictures 1999) (depicting a robot that 
chooses to physically transition to a human—or at least human-like—body); EX 
MACHINA (Universal Pictures 2014) (portraying an AI in the form of an 
attractive female, which is used to influence a human’s perception and 
interaction with the AI); Doctor Who: Smile (BBC television broadcast Apr. 22, 
2017) (involving a character who describes human-on-machine aggression as 
“typical wet-brained chauvinism”). 
 16. If anything, such scenarios have become so common in modern media 
that the introduction of AI into a story is nearly a variant of Chekhov’s gun; the 
presence of AI often demands its role as a villain. See A.I. Is a Crapshoot, TV 
TROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/AIIsACrapshoot (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2017) (“Whenever an Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) is introduced 
in a story, there is a very good chance that it will, for whatever reason, become 
evil and attempt to Turn Against Its Masters, Crush. Kill. Destroy! All Humans, 
and/or Take Over the World. It doesn’t matter what safeguards its creators 
inst[i]ll — the moment it crosses the line into sapience, it has a strong chance 
of going rogue at some point.”). Although the article uses the word “install,” I 
would argue that “instill” is more appropriate, as it conceptually treats AI as a 
mind, rather than a bundle of software. 
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AI, and have garnered significant attention.17 Stephen Hawking 
expressed his view that AI could doom humanity.18 Elon Musk 
has not only been quite vocal about the dangers of rampant AI,19 
but has even organized projects to attempt to prevent what he 
expects to be catastrophic.20 Bill Gates stated the concern quite 
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., Michael Sainato, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates 
Warn About Artificial Intelligence, OBSERVER (Aug. 19, 2105, 12:30 PM), 
http://observer.com/2015/08/stephen-hawking-elon-musk-and-bill-gates-warn-
about-artificial-intelligence/; Victor Luckerson, 5 Very Smart People Who Think 
Artificial Intelligence Could Bring the Apocalypse, TIME (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://time.com/3614349/artificial-intelligence-singularity-stephen-hawking-
elon-musk/; BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, IT IS TWO AND A HALF 
MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT: 2017 DOOMSDAY CLOCK STATEMENT, 1 (John Mecklin 
ed., 2017) https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock 
%20Statement.pdf (“Future technological innovation in biology, artificial 
intelligence, and the cyber realm may pose similar global challenges.”). 
 18. Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence 
Could End Mankind, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news 
/technology-30290540 (“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell 
the end of the human race . . . . Humans, who are limited by slow biological 
evolution, couldn’t compete, and would be superseded.”). 
 19. Greg Kumparak, Elon Musk Compares Building Artificial Intelligence 
to “Summoning the Demon,” TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 26, 2014), https://techcrunch 
.com/2014/10/26/elon-musk-compares-building-artificial-intelligence-to-
summoning-the-demon/ (emphasis added) (“I think we should be very careful 
about artificial intelligence. If I had to guess at what our biggest existential 
threat is, it’s probably that . . . . I’m increasingly inclined to think that there 
should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and international 
level, just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish. With artificial 
intelligence we’re summoning the demon . . . . HAL 9000 would be easy [to deal 
with in comparison to the AI he’s talking about]. It’s way more complex . . . it’d 
put HAL9000 to shame.”); Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (Aug. 2, 2014 7:33 
PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/495759307346952192 (emphasis 
added) (“Worth reading Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super 
careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes.”); Elon Musk 
(@elonmusk), TWITTER (Aug. 3, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk 
/status/496012177103663104 (“Hope we’re not just the biological boot loader for 
digital superintelligence. Unfortunately, that is increasingly probable”); see also 
Buck-Nasty, Elon Musk’s Deleted Edge Comment from Yesterday On the Threat 
of AI, REDDIT (Nov. 16, 2014, 5:35 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/Futurology 
/comments/2mh8tn/elon_musks_deleted_edge_comment_from_yesterday_on/ 
(emphasis added) (archiving a statement by Elon Musk published on Edge.org, 
which is no longer available) (“The pace of progress in artificial 
intelligence . . . is incredibly fast . . . . The risk of something seriously dangerous 
happening is in the five[-]year timeframe. 10 years at most. This is not a case 
of crying wolf about something I don’t understand. I am not alone in thinking 
we should be worried.”). 
 20. See April Glaser, Elon Musk’s Nonprofit Is Working with Microsoft to 
Help Make Sure Robots Don’t Take over the World, RECODE (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:23 
PM), http://www.recode.net/2016/11/15/13639030/microsoft-elon-musk-
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succinctly, “I am in the camp that is concerned about super 
intelligence . . . and [I] don’t understand why some people are not 
concerned.”21 
As AI development progresses, there may be potential for 
NBI emergence. Such advances present a split reaction: the 
potential benefits in light of the harms that might befall 
humans, with minimal concern for NBIs. 
B. ARE MACHINES CAPABLE OF THOUGHT? 
Almost seven decades ago, Alan Turing kick-started the 
discussion of artificial intelligence by posing the question, “can 
machines think?”22 He distilled this ambiguous question into a 
quintessential test of true AI: the Turing Test.23 Turing’s test, 
an “imitation game,”24 sets forth a scenario to test if a 
sufficiently advanced computer could indistinguishably function 
in a series of interactions with people (unaware of its non-
humanness) in the same capacity as a human.25 In addition to 
laying the groundwork for conceptualizing a thinking machine, 
Turing also contemplated the development of AI over time, with 
near-prophetic vision.26 He stated “at the end of the century the 
                                                          
nonprofit-open-ai-artificial-intelligence-robots; Steven Levy, How Elon Musk 
and Y Combinator Plan to Stop Computers from Taking over, WIRED: 
BACKCHANNEL (Dec. 11, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/how-
elon-musk-and-y-combinator-plan-to-stop-computers-from-taking-over/. 
 21. Bill Gates (thisisbillgates), Comment to Hi Reddit, I’m Bill Gates and 
I’m Back for My Third AMA. Ask Me Anything., REDDIT (Jan. 28, 2015 5:48 PM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/2tzjp7/hi_reddit_im_bill_gates_and
_im_back_for_my_third/co3r3g8/; see also Peter Holley, Bill Gates on Dangers 
of Artificial intelligence: I Don’t Understand Why Some People Are Not 
Concerned, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015) (emphasis added), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/28/bill-gates-on-dangers-of-
artificial-intelligence-dont-understand-why-some-people-are-not-
concerned/?tid=a_inl. 
 22. Turing, supra note 4, at 433. 
 23. Id. at 433–34. 
 24. Turing’s phrase has led to a common misinterpretation that the test is 
one of mimicry, rather than an equivalency with human capabilities. See Stevan 
Harnad, The Turing Test is Not a Trick: Turing Indistinguishability is a 
Scientific Criterion, SIGART BULL., Oct. 1992, at 9–10. 
 25. See Turing, supra note 4, at 442 (“Is it true that by modifying [a] 
computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, 
and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to play 
satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by 
a man?”). 
 26. Id. at 454–60. 
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use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so 
much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without 
expecting to be contradicted,” a hypothesis arguably proven 
through the pursuit of AI by mainstream companies and 
researchers (perhaps even the existence of this Note).27 Turing’s 
hypotheses were made during the infancy of computing, long 
before ubiquitous pocket computers28 that can perform six orders 
of magnitude more calculations per second than the most 
powerful computer in those early years.29 
Further blurring the line of thinking machines, modern 
neuroscience has shown that neural systems resemble 
“information processing machines” and can be described “based 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 442. Turing did express that he did not have “very convincing 
arguments of a positive nature to support [his] views.” Id. at 454. 
Retrospectively, history seems to have validated some of his views, as his ideas 
mesh quite neatly with subsequent developments (such as carving out machine 
and deep learning into subsets of general AI, which is similar to his idea that 
potential AI would need to be subjected to an education process). See generally 
Michael Copeland, What’s the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, 
Machine Learning, and Deep Learning?, NVIDIA (July 29, 2016), https://blogs 
.nvidia.com/blog/2016/07/29/whats-difference-artificial-intelligence-machine-
learning-deep-learning-ai/ (describing both deep and machine as algorithmic 
learning processes, which are trained via large data sets; machine learning 
relies on progressive refinement of those algorithms, often by hand, whereas 
deep learning utilizes recent advancements in parallel computing and neural 
networks that teach themselves through millions of samples). 
 28. See Tim Fernholz, More People Around the World Have Cell Phones 
Than Ever Had Land-Lines, QUARTZ (Feb. 25, 2014), https://qz.com/179897 
/more-people-around-the-world-have-cell-phones-than-ever-had-land-lines/ 
(citing to “the United Nations’ telecommunications agency,” which is 
presumably the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and describing 
cellular telephone subscription rates of 96 per 100 people globally in 2013, with 
89.4% penetration in “poor countries”). 
 29. See Processing Power Compared, EXPERTS EXCHANGE, http://pages 
.experts-exchange.com/processing-power-compared/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) 
(examining computing power from 1956 through 2015). This article provides 
some useful visualizations and comparisons of notable devices. Note the earliest 
machine in this data, the 1956 IBM 704, which managed 1.2x104 floating point 
operations per second (FLOPs); and the Samsung Galaxy 6, one of 2015’s 
popular phones, at about 3.5x1010 FLOPS. This infographic also depicts today’s 
leading machine, Tianhe-2, which tips the scales at a whopping 3.4x1016 
FLOPS—ten orders of magnitude greater than the acme of computing when I.J. 
Good published his piece in 1966. See Good, supra note 2. The CDC 6600, the 
fastest supercomputer in the late 1960s, peaked at approximately 3x106 
FLOPS. Here I have used scientific notation for clarity in the magnification of 
scale. For comparisons which may use prefixes, these machines respectively 
reach speeds of twelve kiloFLOPS, thirty-five gigaFLOPS, thirty-four 
petaFLOPS, and three megaFLOPS. 
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on the concepts of algorithm, representation, computation, and 
information processing.”30 Some research even suggests that 
biological intelligence may be “rooted in” an algorithm.31 
C. INTELLIGENCE EXPLOSIONS AND THE SINGULARITY 
Today’s world is greatly enriched by rapidly advancing 
technology,32 which begs the question: Where does it lead? Many 
authors predict the Singularity, when intelligence recursively 
improves itself, causing the rate of technology development to 
increase exponentially with each more powerful iteration 
occurring in a shorter timespan than the last.33 In most 
predictions, the Singularity results from an intelligence 
explosion, the hypothetical point where technology results in a 
sort of feedback loop; a cascade where each intelligent creation 
makes its successor more intelligent than itself—rapidly 
rendering previous generations obsolete.34 A majority of such 
                                                          
 30. A. David Redish, The Dangers of Dualism: Implications of the Multiple 
Decision-Making System Theory for Free Will and Responsibility, 7 COGNITIVE 
CRITIQUE 1, 4, 9 (2013). Part of this analysis is the rejection of dualism—
attributing brain function to external forces. Id. at 3. 
 31. Kun Xie et al., Brain Computation Is Organized via Power-of-Two-
Based Permutation Logic, FRONTIERS IN SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE, Nov. 2016, 
at 1 (“[T]he origin of intelligence is rooted in a power-of-two-based permutation 
logic (N = 2i–1).”). 
 32. See generally 50 Years of Moore’s Law, INTEL, http://www.intel.com 
/content/www/us/en/silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2017) (discussing Moore’s Law as a driving force of technological 
development); Tom Simonite, Moore’s Law Is Dead. Now What?, MIT TECH. 
REV. (May 13, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-
is-dead-now-what/ (summarizing the approaching end of Moore’s Law). The 
basic premise of Moore’s Law, articulated by Intel cofounder Gordon Moore, is 
that computing performance increases at a predictable rate; roughly doubling 
every two years. Id. 
 33. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR 14–21 (2006); Vernor 
Vinge, The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-
Human Era, 1993 NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., VISION-21, at 11, 12 
(1993). 
 34. See Good, supra note 2, at 33 (“Let an ultraintelligent machine be 
defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any 
man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual 
activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there 
would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,’ and the intelligence of 
man would be left far behind . . . . Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the 
last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile 
enough to tell us how to keep it under control.”). Despite its apocalyptic tone, 
this is one of the earliest descriptions (I.J. Good was a colleague of Alan Turing) 
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predictions are extrapolations of Moore’s Law or economic 
models, but the same conclusion can be reached via other 
reasoning.35 
The exact circumstances of this event are speculative; some 
of the hypotheses include: “[t]he development of computers that 
are ‘awake’ and superhumanly intelligent[,] . . . [l]arge computer 
networks (and their associated users) may ‘wake up’ . . . [or] 
[c]omputer/human interfaces may become so intimate that users 
may reasonably be considered superhumanly intelligent.”36 
Alternatively, the Singularity could also take the form of 
enhancement to natural human intelligence or a merger of 
biology and computing technology.37 The Singularity is a highly 
speculative proposition, but its advocates take the stance that “if 
the technological Singularity can happen, it will.”38 
With seemingly constant news of rapid developments in 
artificial intelligence,39 one must wonder how close such a 
scenario may be.40 The titans of the tech industry are intently 
focused on developing AI.41 The AI market contains a significant 
                                                          
of an “intelligence explosion,” which provides the underlying concept of the 
Singularity. See also sources cited supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 35. See BOSTROM, supra note 8, at 3 (“However, the case for taking 
seriously the prospect of a machine intelligence revolution need not rely on 
curve-fitting exercises or extrapolations from past economic growth. As we shall 
see, there are stronger reasons for taking heed.”); KURZWEIL, supra note 33; 
Vinge, supra note 33. 
 36. Vinge, supra note 33, at 12. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 15. 
 39. A quick visit to Google News and search for “Artificial Intelligence” will 
yield many results, with a consistent daily influx of stories. Setting a news 
notification based on those terms can make for quite the cluttered inbox. 
 40. See, e.g., Greg Satell, 3 Reasons to Believe the Singularity Is Near, 
FORBES (June 3, 2016 11:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2016 
/06/03/3-reasons-to-believe-the-singularity-is-near/#298b88471cbe. 
 41. See, e.g., Deep Learning, NVIDIA, https://blogs.nvidia.com/blog/category 
/deep-learning/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2016) (aggregating deep learning and AI 
research by Nvidia, a major hardware company); Facebook AI Research (FAIR), 
FACEBOOK (emphasis added), https://web.archive.org/web/20161116191404/ 
https://research.facebook.com/ai (last visited Nov. 23, 2016) (“We’re committed 
to advancing the field of machine intelligence and developing technologies . . . . 
In the long term, we seek to understand intelligence and make intelligent 
machines. How will we accomplish all this? By building the best AI lab in the 
world.”); IBM Research: Artificial Intelligence, IBM (emphasis added), 
http://researcher.ibm.com/researcher/view_group.php?id=135 (last visited Nov. 
23, 2016) (“Artificial Intelligence (AI) has a long history at IBM Research, 
dating back to the 1950s. By AI we mean anything that makes machines act 
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number of startups, which are being bolstered with higher-than-
average venture-capital backing.42 Timelines for nearly any AI-
development prediction cover the spectrum from “never”43 to 
“soon”44 to “don’t worry about it.”45 Ray Kurzweil, whose 
technological predictions have been eerily accurate,46 expects 
human-level AI by 2029 (but no Singularity until 2045).47 A 
                                                          
more intelligently. Our work includes basic and applied research in machine 
learning, deep question answering, search and planning, knowledge 
representation, and cognitive architectures.”); Machine Intelligence, RES. 
GOOGLE, http://research.google.com/pubs/MachineIntelligence.html (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2016) (“Research at Google is at the forefront of innovation in 
Machine Intelligence, with active research exploring virtually all aspects of 
machine learning, including deep learning and more classical algorithms.”);  
The Race for AI: Google, Baidu, Intel, Apple in a Rush to Grab Artificial 
Intelligence Startups, CB INSIGHTS (July 21, 2017), https://www.cbinsights 
.com/blog/top-acquirers-ai-startups-ma-timeline/ (discussing acquisitions of AI 
startups by large tech companies). 
 42. Lisa Calhoun, 15 Game-Changing Artificial Intelligence Startups, INC. 
(Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.inc.com/lisa-calhoun/see-13-of-the-artificial-
intelligence-companies-checking-you-out-today.html (“Sixty percent of A.I. 
firms that have been acquired in the past five years are venture-backed. That’s 
an unusually high percentage for a horizontal sector.”). 
 43. See John Searle, What Your Computer Can’t Know, NY REV. BOOKS 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/10/09/what-your-
computer-cant-know/ (arguing that computers lack psychological features 
necessary to be more than boxes of parts). 
 44. See Elon Musk (@ElonMusk), TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2017, 2:33 AM), 
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/904638455761612800 (“[A]ll countries 
[with] strong computer science [will be in c]ompetition for AI superiority at 
national level [and will be the] most likely cause of WW3 . . . .”). 
 45. See Romain Dillet, Google’s AI Chief Thinks Reports of the AI 
Apocalypse Are Greatly Exaggerated, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 19, 2017) (emphasis 
added), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/19/googles-ai-chief-thinks-reports-of-
the-ai-apocalypse-are-greatly-exaggerated/ (“There’s a lot of people that are 
unreasonably concerned around the rise of general AI . . . I’m definitely not 
worried about the AI apocalypse . . . I just object to the hype and soundbites 
that some people are making.”). 
 46. Dominic Basulto, Why Ray Kurzweil’s Predictions Are Right 86% of the 
Time, BIG THINK, http://bigthink.com/endless-innovation/why-ray-kurzweils-
predictions-are-right-86-of-the-time (last visited Nov. 18, 2017) (“In fact, of the 
147 predictions that Kurzweil has made since the 1990’s, fully 115 of them have 
turned out to be correct, and another 12 have turned out to be ‘essentially 
correct’ (off by a year or two), giving his predictions a stunning 86% accuracy 
rate.”). 
 47. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The Future of Artificial Intelligence 
and Its Impact on Society, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6, 2017), at 10:22, https://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=P7nK1HVJsj4 (video of interview with Ray Kurzweil, 
transcript available at https://www.cfr.org/event/future-artificial-intelligence-
and-its-impact-society) (discussing his 2029 prediction for “human level” AI that 
can pass the Turing test); Dom Galeon & Christianna Reedy, Kurzweil Claims 
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survey of experts and nonexperts found the average prediction 
of AGI creation to be 2040, i.e., barely twenty years from now.48 
However, twenty years may just be a convenient number for 
speculation and predicted AI timelines are “quite poor.”49 
The Singularity is the most dramatic representation of the 
future of AI and related technologies. It is extremely speculative, 
but serves an illustrative point of very real concerns. Before we 
reach such a momentous event, other technologies will likely 
require answers to questions of thinking machines and how the 
law treats such entities. 
D. HUMAN BRAIN AUGMENTATION & DIGITIZATION, SIMULATION 
AND EMULATION 
Emergence of sapient artificial intelligence may not be the 
first digital being created; researchers may first create an 
inorganic human consciousness through simulation.50 The 
                                                          
That the Singularity Will Happen by 2045, FUTURISM (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://futurism.com/kurzweil-claims-that-the-singularity-will-happen-by-
2045/ (“I have set the date 2045 for the ‘Singularity’ which is when we will 
multiply our effective intelligence a billion fold by merging with the intelligence 
we have created.”). 
 48. See Stuart Armstrong & Kaj Sotala, How We’re Predicting AI—or 
Failing to, in BEYOND AI: ARTIFICIAL DREAMS, MACH. INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
INST. 52 (Jan Romportl ed., 2012); Stuart Armstrong, How We’re Predicting AI, 
FORA.TV (Oct. 14, 2012), http://library.fora.tv/2012/10/14/Stuart_Armstrong 
_How_Were_Predicting_AI (recording of presentation by Dr. Stuart Armstrong 
at The Singularity Summit 2012). While Armstrong & Sotala have noted that a 
dataset error contributed to their findings, that error was in the classification 
of expert or non-expert predictions, which is not factored into the prediction 
used here. Error in Armstrong and Sotala 2012, AI IMPACTS (May 17, 2016), 
https://aiimpacts.org/error-in-armstrong-and-sotala-2012/. It is interesting to 
note that Kurzweil has seen these consensus predictions shift towards his 
prediction. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 47, at 11:00 (“My view, 
and the consensus view, or the median view, of AI experts have been getting 
closer together, but not because I’ve been changing my view [stated in 1999].”). 
 49. Armstrong & Sotala, supra note 48, at 52; see also BOSTROM, supra note 
8, at 4 (“Two decades is a sweet spot for prognosticators of radical change: near 
enough to be attention-grabbing and relevant, yet far enough to make it possible 
to suppose that a string of breakthroughs, currently only vaguely imaginable, 
might by then have occurred.”). 
 50. See KURZWEIL, supra note 33, at 407. Kurzweil entertains the idea that 
our reality is a “universe-scale computer” running another civilization’s 
simulation of the Singularity. Id. at 364–67, 404–05. This reality-as-simulation 
concept has caught the public imagination in recent debate, even garnering 
some support from notable people such as Neil deGrasse Tyson. Am. Museum 
of Nat. History, 2016 Isaac Asimov Memorial Debate: Is the Universe a 
Simulation?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time 
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ability to simulate or emulate51 the human brain is limited by 
computing power and ability to map the brain (connectome) with 
sufficient detail.52 Several projects are currently underway to 
develop brain simulation technology, backed by bodies including 
the EU and NIH.53 
                                                          
_continue=2&v=wgSZA3NPpBs (showing Tyson and others’ debate on reality 
as a simulation). It follows that after simulation of one brain, an increased scale 
would be the logical progression. 
 51. These terms are often used interchangeably, but the difference between 
them may prove important. Simulation models a system; the focus is to replicate 
the end product. Simulate, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (emphasis added), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/simulate (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) 
(“Imitate the appearance or character of.”). Emulation models the underlying 
process(es). Emulate, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (emphasis added), 
https://en .oxforddictionaries.com/definition/emulate (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) 
(“Reproduce the function or action of”). Thus for purposes here, a simulated 
brain would imitate the brain to create an intelligence; whereas an emulated 
brain would (ideally) exactly replicate brain functions, creating an intelligence. 
The nuance, if any, between these may only become apparent upon performing 
them. A true one-to-one emulation would be a precise representation of a brain, 
which should produce an identical result to its biological equivalent. A 
simulation could result in several outcomes: it might produce essentially the 
same result, where approximation is sufficient; it might produce an intelligence 
with reduced functionality compared to the original brain, indicating that some 
intrinsic factor is missing (this might mean that simulation is not sufficiently 
advanced, rather than outright infeasible); or it might produce a result that is 
not analogous to the source, which is exciting in and of itself (arguably this 
would be a construct AI, rather than a formerly/concurrently biological 
intelligence). 
 52. See KURZWEIL, supra note 33, at 407. 
 53. See In Brief, BLUE BRAIN PROJECT, http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/page-56882-
en.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2016) (“The goal of the Blue Brain Project is to 
build biologically detailed digital reconstructions and simulations of the rodent, 
and ultimately the human brain . . . . Supercomputer-based simulation of their 
behavior turns understanding the brain into a tractable problem, providing a 
new tool to study the complex interactions within different levels of brain 
organization and to investigate the cross-level links leading from genes to 
cognition.”) (BBP is run by École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne); 
Overview, HUMAN BRAIN PROJECT, https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/en 
/science/overview/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2016) (HBP is a European Commission 
Future and Emerging Technologies Flagship and co-funded by the EU); About 
the CCF (CCF Overview), CONNECTOME COORDINATION FACILITY (May 18, 2016 
2:24 PM), https://www.humanconnectome.org/about-ccf/ (“Over the next decade, 
we expect to see dozens of new projects . . . researching aspects of how age, 
growth, disease, and other factors can affect the ever-changing connections in 
the human brain.”) (HCP is a NIH program as part of the Blueprint for 
Neuroscience Research initiative). 
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Public awareness of brain simulation is mostly limited to 
science fiction.54 Researchers have varying estimates of the 
timeframe, but most expect it to be more immediate than 
Singularity hypotheses.55 Rudimentary simulations have 
already taken place—a whole organism56 and a neuronal 
network representing approximately 1% of a human brain.57 The 
power of the computers used in these simulations has been 
eclipsed (almost tenfold) by new machines, which are set to be 
leapfrogged in the near future.58 Exascale computers, which 
                                                          
 54. See, e.g., JOHN SCALZI, OLD MAN’S WAR (2005) (depicting a world where 
people can enlist in interstellar military service, which transfers enlisted minds 
to combat-oriented bodies, in exchange for a new, personal body post-service); 
Black Mirror: San Junipero (BBC/Netflix television broadcast Oct. 21, 2016) 
(depicting a near future where people upload their minds to a paradisiacal 
computer simulation upon bodily death, resulting in uninterrupted 
continuation of a person’s mind); Westworld (HBO television broadcast Oct. 2 – 
Dec. 4, 2016) (portraying a theme park filled with AIs in physical forms very 
similar to human biology, with implications that these AIs are modeled from 
human brains). 
 55. Jonathan Fildes, Artificial Brain 10 Years Away, BBC NEWS (July 22, 
2009, 7:05 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8164060.stm (reporting that the 
director of the Blue Brain Project stated a human brain could be built by 2019). 
 56. Max McClure, Stanford Researchers Produce First Complete Computer 
Model of an Organism, STAN. REP. (July 19, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu 
/news/2012/july/computer-model-organism-071812.html (“[T]he world’s first 
complete computer model of an organism has been completed . . . .”). 
 57. Largest Neuronal Network Simulation Achieved Using K Computer, 
RIKEN (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.riken.jp/en/pr/press/2013/20130802_1/. Note 
that the K Computer used for this simulation (three years ago) is capable of 
10.51 petaflops, whereas the top (publicly known) supercomputer produces 93 
petaflops. November 2016, TOP 500 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.top500.org 
/lists/2016/11/. 
 58. See November 2016, supra note 57. The United States government has 
ordered several new clusters, with estimated speeds of 200–300 petaflops; these 
new systems are expected to be in use by 2018. See Summit, OAK RIDGE NAT’L 
LAB, https://www.olcf.ornl.gov/summit/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2016) (detailing 
specifications for Summit computer and 2018 deployment); Patrick Thibodeau, 
U.S. Sets Sights on 300 Petaflop Supercomputer, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 14, 
2014 12:51 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2847865/us-sets-sights-
on-300-petaflop-supercomputer.html (describing plans for multiple new 
systems with speeds up to 300 petaflops); Patrick Thibodeau, U.S. to Have 200-
Petaflop Supercomputer by Early 2018, COMPUTERWORLD (June 21, 2016, 3:00 
AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3086178/high-performance-
computing/u-s-to-have-200-petaflop-supercomputer-by-early-2018.html 
(confirming expectation of Summit system as 200 petaflop system). 
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reach the predicted threshold needed for brain simulation,59 are 
expected to be in service around 2020.60 
As computing power escalates and research continues to 
create a more robust map of the human brain, brain simulation 
projects will come ever closer to digital replication of human 
brains. 
E. CRITIQUES OF NBI PREDICTIONS 
The possibility of NBI is purely hypothetical, and some 
propose that NBIs are impossible or cannot be created with 
current technologies.61 Some would argue some form of dualism, 
that there is something special about human mental processes 
beyond the physical state.62 Others propose that a machine that 
appeared to be human-like cannot have a “mind,” but would 
plateau at extremely well-programmed mimicry.63 Human-
exceptionalism arguments tend to assume some unknown, and 
perhaps unknowable, barrier to thinking machines. However, 
human intelligence may not be particularly special.64 
                                                          
 59. Bernd Mohr, The Human Brain Project Will Push the Boundaries of 
Supercomputing, TOP 500 (Dec. 29, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.top500.org 
/news/the-human-brain-project-will-push-the-boundaries-of-supercomputing/ 
(“Full brain simulations are expected to require exascale capabilities.”). 
 60. See Michael Feldman, The Four-Way Race to Exascale, TOP 500 (May 
19, 2016, 10:32 PM), https://www.top500.org/news/the-four-way-race-to-
exascale/ (detailing Japan and China’s efforts to have exascale computers by 
2020 and the United States Department of Energy’s Exascale Computing Plan, 
which has a goal of 2023). 
 61. See Nick Seneca Jankel, AI vs. Human Intelligence: Why Computers 
Will Never Create Disruptive Innovations, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2015, 
5:36 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-seneca-jankel/ai-vs-human-
intelligence-_b_6741814.html (“No machine will ever be able to mimic our 
peerless organic nature as inherently, inescapably, beguilingly creative.”). 
 62. See Redish, supra note 30, at 9 (discussing, and rejecting, hypotheses 
that “there are mental states that are dissociable from the physical states 
underlying them”). 
 63. John Searle, Chinese Room Argument, SCHOLARPEDIA (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Chinese_room_argument (“One can no 
more create consciousness and thought by running a computer simulation of 
consciousness and thought, than one can build a flying machine simply by 
building a computer that can simulate flight.”). Searle claims that his Chinese 
Room argument does not denounce thinking machines, it just indicates that any 
that might be created will be a mere model. Id. As discussed earlier, modern 
neuroscience uses computational models of neural processing, which seems to 
oppose Searle’s position of simulation impossibility. See Redish, supra note 30. 
 64. See BOSTROM, supra note 8, at 44 (“[T]here is no reason to suppose 
Homo sapiens to have reached the apex of cognitive effectiveness attainable in 
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Many counter-theories argue that predictions based on 
technological growth patterns are severely flawed.65 It is 
undeniable that Moore’s Law cannot continue forever, as there 
are physical limitations to the increase in transistor density, and 
that barrier may limit technological growth.66 However, the end 
of Moore’s Law applies to electronic computing components.67 
There are a number of other computing technologies under 
development, which will likely prove to be more powerful than 
traditional electronics.68 GPU-computing methods are already 
superior to traditional processors in AI applications.69 
Others contend that the pursuit of narrow AI undermines 
the developments of NBIs.70 In the short term, narrow AI is 
profitable and will likely remain at the forefront of AI 
development.71 As narrow AI is developed and applied, it may 
start to resemble AGI, perhaps unintentionally.72 Although it is 
unclear whether NBI is possible, the potential for NBI 
emergence cannot be dismissed even with these contentions in 
mind. 
                                                          
a biological system. Far from being the smartest possible biological species, we 
are probably better thought of as the stupidest possible biological species 
capable of starting a technological civilization—a niche we filled because we got 
there first, not because we are in any sense optimally adapted to it.”). 
 65. See Alan Winfield, Artificial Intelligence Will Not Turn into a 
Frankenstein’s Monster, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian 
.com/technology/2014/aug/10/artificial-intelligence-will-not-become-a-
frankensteins-monster-ian-winfield (arguing that faster-than-light travel may 
be more proximate than AGI). 
 66. Thomas N. Theis & H.-S. Philip Wong, The End of Moore’s Law: A New 
Beginning for Information Technology, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, Mar.–
Apr. 2017, at 41, 42–44. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 44–45, 48–49 (noting efforts to advance electronic computing 
once transistor limits are reached and alternative computing technologies, such 
as biological computing). Quantum computing and neuromorphic processors 
have also seen recent successes. Id. at 48–49. 
 69. See Huang, supra note 6, and related discussion. 
 70. See Yarden Katz, Noam Chomsky on Where Artificial Intelligence Went 
Wrong, ATLANTIC (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology 
/archive/2012/11/noam-chomsky-on-where-artificial-intelligence-went-
wrong/261637/?single_page=true (“[AI] focused on using statistical learning 
techniques to better mine and predict data—is unlikely to yield general 
principles about the nature of intelligent beings or about cognition.”). 
 71. See supra Part I.A and related discussion. 
 72. See BARRAT, supra note 13, at 39–41 (discussing how Google denies 
working on AGI but the desired functionality seems to be more than a narrow 
application). 
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F. LEGAL PERSONHOOD 
1. What Is a Person? 
Civil rights are intrinsically linked to personhood, which is 
a surprisingly ambiguous concept. Even when narrowing to a 
“legal person,” the concept is, at best, “fuzzy.”73 This fuzziness 
may lie in that a definition has not been needed for much beyond 
day-to-day human interaction.74 
Looking to legal definitions, a person is defined in Black’s 
Law Dictionary as “a human being.”75 Certainly not a very 
flexible definition. Black’s Law also provides a definition of an 
“artificial person” as “[a]n entity, such as a corporation, created 
by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human 
being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal 
reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.”76 Looking to 
the broader term, an entity is defined as an organization.77 
Putting the pieces of the legal-dictionary puzzle together, a 
person must be either a human or an organization. 
The Supreme Court has recently addressed interpretation 
of a person.78 The Court looks to the Dictionary Act to define a 
person to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”79 The Supreme Court has also used human biology 
as a condition of personhood.80 
                                                          
 73. See Alexis Dyschkant, Note, Legal Personhood: How We Are Getting It 
Wrong, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2075, 2079. 
 74. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 
N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1285 (1992) (“All of the persons we have met have been 
humans . . . it is not surprising that our concept of person is fuzzy at the edges. 
For most practical purposes, this fuzziness does not get in our way. We treat 
humans as persons, and we need not worry about why we do so.”). 
 75. Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 76. Artificial Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis 
added). 
 77. Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) 
(“An organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that has a legal 
identity apart from its members or owners.”). 
 78. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 79. Id. at 2768; see also id. at 2769 (“The term ‘person’ sometimes 
encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it 
sometimes is limited to natural persons.”); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (codifying the 
Dictionary Act). 
 80. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“[Children] are humans, live, 
and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons.’”). 
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Such narrow definitions are not limited to legal jargon; 
common definitions are similarly restrictive. Dictionaries use 
definitions of person such as “[a] human being regarded as an 
individual”81 or ones mirroring the legal definition.82 “Being” is 
a potentially viable word to describe entities examined in this 
Note; it is defined as “conscious existence.”83 
For a less restrictive view of personhood, many fields proffer 
innumerable theories to conceptualize a being, but no hard-and-
fast definition can meet the vast range of human experience. Is 
it measured by consciousness?84 Perhaps sentience?85 
Sapience?86 Are there degrees, perhaps imparted by some 
intangible aspect that compounds upon itself until it accretes 
into a person?87 Despite the plethora of interpretations, 
personhood may be best defined by that very web of uncertainty. 
The most comprehensive, or at least reasonably functional, 
definition might well be Justice Stewart’s standard for material 
that escapes clear definition: “I know it when I see it.”88 
                                                          
 81. Person, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/person (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 82. Person, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/person (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (defining “person” as 
“one (such as a human being, a partnership, or a corporation) that is recognized 
by law as the subject of rights and duties”). 
 83. Being, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/being (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). 
 84. See David B. Fischer et al., A Human Brain Network Derived from 
Coma-Causing Brainstem Lesions, 87 NEUROLOGY, 2427, 2427 (2016) (“Arousal, 
or wakefulness, is an integral component of consciousness and prerequisite for 
other brain functions . . . .”); see also Press Release, Beth Israel Deaconess Med. 
Ctr., Insight into the Seat of Human Consciousness (Nov. 4, 2016), 
http://www.bidmc.org/News/PRLandingPage/2016/November/Fox-
Consciousness.aspx; Fiona MacDonald, Harvard Scientists Think They’ve 
Pinpointed the Physical Source of Consciousness, SCI. ALERT (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.sciencealert.com/harvard-scientists-think-they-ve-pinpointed-the-
neural-source-of-consciousness. 
 85. Sentient, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/sentient (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (“able to perceive or feel 
things”). 
 86. ROBERT J. STERNBERG, WISDOM, INTELLIGENCE, AND CREATIVITY 
SYNTHESIZED (2003) (proposing wisdom to include extra mental processing 
beyond intelligence). 
 87. See generally DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, I AM A STRANGE LOOP (2007). 
 88. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I 
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to 
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”). This also permits 
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2. What Boundaries Are Imposed on the Concept of Person? 
Examining the concept of a person from the finale, rather 
than the beginning can help define the limits of persons. Death 
is the end of natural persons, yet there is no true bright-line rule 
defining death—designated criteria such as respiration, 
circulation, and brain function have proven insufficient to 
generate truly dispositive results.89 Many states have adopted 
the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA).90 The UDDA 
determines death as the state when “[a]n individual [] has 
sustained irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 
functions, or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem.”91 However, as medicine 
advances, situations unforeseen by the drafters have introduced 
ambiguities and conflicting scenarios.92 
Artificial persons, in the current legal terminology, are 
generally terminated upon the completion of designated 
functions or an act by the constituent members of the entity.93 
                                                          
this Note to sidestep the need to answer a profound question far beyond its 
scope. 
 89. See M. Potts & D.W. Evans, Does It Matter That Organ Donors Are Not 
Dead? Ethical and Policy Implications, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 406 (2005) 
(examining criticism of brain death criteria); Barbara Mantel, ‘Dead’ Man’s 
Recovery Shows Why Prolonged CPR Works, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013, 6:56 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/dead-mans-recovery-shows-why-
prolonged-cpr-works-6C10980325 (describing an incident where doctors 
declared a man, who had no respiratory, circulatory, or electrical heart activity, 
dead after 45 minutes of resuscitation efforts, only to successfully resuscitate 
him minutes later, when they detected a trace of heart activity). See generally 
OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014) (covering brain death 
in Chapter 10). 
 90. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Determination of Death Act, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title 
=Determination%20of%20Death%20Act (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (identifying 
enactment in 37 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia). 
 91. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980) 
(emphasis added). 
 92. For example, cessation of circulation and respiration can now be 
reversed with mechanical intervention, the language does not require natural 
means of reversal. A particularly dark interpretation of the “either . . . or” 
structure here could declare a person with full brain function to be dead under 
the other prong. See id. 
 93. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (“A 
partnership is dissolved . . . upon the occurrence of any of the following 
[events] . . . the affirmative vote or consent of all of the partners to wind up the 
partnership business; or . . . the expiration of the term or the completion of the 
undertaking.”). 
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In some circumstances, artificial persons can be brought to an 
end through judicial order.94 
3. What Rights Are Given to a Person? 
The Due Process95 and Equal Protection96 Clauses apply to 
artificial persons, but other rights are limited.97 Artificial 
persons are not citizens and do not receive the associated 
privileges and immunities.98 This lack of citizenship also limits 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 These exceptions, 
such as interstate extradition, logically follow the current 
definition of artificial persons, which essentially limits these 
persons to organizations without physical form.100 In Burwell, 
the Supreme Court allowed an artificial person to exercise 
religious freedom, yet did not definitively determine whether 
First Amendment rights protect an artificial person.101 An 
artificial person’s rights are derivative of those of a natural 
person and are reduced in ways that seem to reflect non-
corporeal status. 
Potential NBIs seem intrinsically linked to research 
projects. For humans, extensive protections have been 
implemented to prevent harm to test subjects.102 For most US-
based research, the Common Rule applies, which is structured 
around respect (particularly of autonomy), beneficence, and 
                                                          
 94. Id. 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 97. Artificial Person, supra note 76 (“An entity is a person for purposes of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses but is not a citizen for purposes 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses in Article IV § 2 and in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 98. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2. 
 99. See Artificial Person, supra note 76; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV. 
 100. See U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2 (“The citizens of each state shall be entitled 
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. A person 
charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from 
justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive 
authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the 
state having jurisdiction of the crime.”); Artificial Person, supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
 101. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) 
(“Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the 
First Amendment claim.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 102. HHS Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2017). For this 
Note, I will reference the HHS version of the Common Rule. 
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justice.103 The Common Rule is designed to cast a long shadow 
and has been adopted by many federal departments and 
agencies.104 Aside from a short list of very narrow exceptions, it 
“applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, 
supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal 
department or agency.”105 The Common Rule requires that 
research be approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
which must meet certain requirements and follow specific 
procedures.106 When reviewed by an IRB, research must satisfy 
all criteria for approval.107 The research must: 1) minimize risk 
to subjects; 2) ensure that any risk which may result from 
research is reasonable, when considering the expected 
knowledge gained and potential benefits to subjects; 3) select 
subjects equitably; 4) obtain informed consent from subjects; 5) 
document subjects’ informed consent; 6) be adequately 
monitored to ensure subject safety; and 7) safeguard subject 
privacy and confidential data.108 Additionally, research 
involving vulnerable subjects must provide additional 
precautions “to protect the rights and welfare of these 
subjects.”109 The core of the Common Rule is to minimize risk to 
                                                          
 103. Frequently Asked Questions and Vignettes: Interpreting the Common 
Rule for the Protection of Human Subjects for Behavioral and Social Science 
Research, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. [hereinafter FAQ], https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias 
/policy/hsfaqs.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2017). 
 104. Department of Agriculture Protection of Human Subjects, 7 C.F.R. § 1c 
(2017); Department of Energy Protection of Human Subjects, 10 C.F.R. § 745 
(2017); NASA Protection of Human Subjects, 14 C.F.R. § 1230 (2017); 
Department of Commerce Protection of Human Subjects, 15 C.F.R. § 27 (2017); 
Consumer Product Safety Commission Protection of Human Subjects, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 1028 (2017); Agency for International Development Protection of Human 
Subjects, 22 C.F.R. § 225 (2017); Department of Housing and Urban 
Development Protection of Human Subjects, 24 C.F.R. § 60 (2017); Department 
of Justice Protection of Human Subjects, 28 C.F.R. § 46 (2017); Department of 
Defense Protection of Human Subjects, 32 C.F.R. § 219 (2017); Department of 
Education Protection of Human Subjects, 34 C.F.R. § 97 (2017); Department of 
Veterans Affairs Protection of Human Subjects, 38 C.F.R. § 16 (2017); EPA 
Protection of Human Subjects, 40 C.F.R. § 26 (2017); NSF Protection of Human 
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 690 (2017); Department of Transportation Protection of 
Human Subjects, 49 C.F.R. § 11 (2017). 
 105. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2017); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (2017) 
(listing the six exceptions, which generally have a negligible impact on the 
subject). 
 106. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107–109 (2017). 
 107. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (2017). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (2017). 
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and prevent harm of human test subjects.110 It does, however, 
explicitly require additional measures to be taken to protect 
vulnerable subjects.111 
II. ANALYSIS 
Current views of personhood, and any associated rights or 
protections, are grounded in one’s status as either a human 
being or a legal construct used to carry out a functional purpose, 
generally for businesses.112 Advances in technology will likely 
give rise to entities (NBIs) that do not meet current definitions 
of a person (or even life), yet possess the mental faculties 
(consciousness, sentience, “just are,” etc.) equivalent to human 
beings. Without intervention, when these entities come into 
being, failing to afford them basic protections will result in grave 
risk of injustice. While a comprehensive structure of personhood 
for such unknowable manifestations is likely premature, laying 
foundations in advance is crucial given the indefinite nature and 
timing of NBI emergence. 
A. IT IS LIKELY THAT NON-BIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE WILL 
ARISE IN THE FUTURE 
The technologies described in Part I should, at the very 
least, cause one to consider the emergence of NBI. If a single one 
of these technologies follows its current trajectory, NBIs will 
exist in a historical blink-of-the-eye.113 Even by conservative 
estimates, many of those technologies appear to be possible, at 
some point achievable, and progressing towards realization.114 
                                                          
 110. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2017) (denoting “human subject” as core of 
research); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2017) (defining minimal risk as “the probability 
and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater 
in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during 
the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests”); 45 
C.F.R. § 46.110 (2017) (allowing for expedited, but not eliminated, approval of 
research with minimal risk); 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (2017) (providing for 
termination of research “that is not being conducted in accordance with the 
IRB’s requirements or that has been associated with unexpected serious harm 
to subjects”). 
 111. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). 
 112. See supra Part I.F. 
 113. See supra Parts I.A–D. 
 114. See supra Parts I.A–D. 
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Some argue that AI and the Singularity are inevitable.115 An 
NBI might even arise spontaneously as an unexpected 
consequence of humanity’s symbiosis with technology or some 
other event.116 The possibility of NBI, although speculative, has 
garnered action by the EU, which stated: 
[U]ltimately there is a possibility that within the space of a few decades 
AI could surpass human intellectual capacity in a manner which, if not 
prepared for, could pose a challenge to humanity’s capacity to control 
its own creation and, consequently, perhaps also to its capacity to be in 
charge of its own destiny and to ensure the survival of the species.117 
The potential emergence of an NBI is difficult to predict 
accurately and would pose novel legal questions in need of quick 
resolution, creating a need for preemptive framework. Before 
looking ahead, this Note must examine if NBIs fit into existing 
schema. 
B. HOW COULD PERSONHOOD FIT A NON-BIOLOGICAL 
INTELLIGENCE? 
NBIs should receive some form of personhood or person-like 
status. NBIs might, at least in rudimentary forms, be treated 
akin to animals or other protected non-persons.118 Given the rate 
of technological development, NBIs would likely outgrow limited 
protections.119 The more strenuous protections provided to 
persons should be preemptively modeled for NBIs. 
NBIs do not clearly fit into the any extant category of 
persons and the path forward is uncertain, although legislators 
                                                          
 115. See KURZWEIL, supra note 33; see also Andrew Sheehy, 
Superintelligence Is Not Just Possible, but Inevitable, FORBES (June 22, 2016, 
1:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsheehy/2016/06/22 
/superintelligence-is-not-just-possible-but-inevitable/#13b8450532a6 (arguing 
that software, as we write it, may be a representation of intelligence that exists 
when it is run). 
 116. Kevin Warwick, The Disappearing Human-Machine Divide, in 
BEYOND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE DISAPPEARING HUMAN-MACHINE 
DIVIDE 1, 6–9 (Jan Romportl et al. eds., 2014). 
 117. Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with Recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 4, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 
2016). 
 118. See, e.g., S.M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, 
Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
L. 155, 161 (2017). 
 119. See BARRAT, supra note 13, at 37, 99–100 (describing how a mildly 
intelligent AI could become much more intelligent in a very short time). 
328 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:1 
 
are beginning to explore potential issues.120 However, the 
foundation is being put down now; adoption of new technologies 
has prompted action.121 As non-human entities, NBIs cannot be 
natural persons.122 NBIs might be recognizable as artificial 
persons—an entity with some rights treated like a human.123 
Yet, for a thinking being, this has grave implications. NBIs, as 
artificial persons, would enter this world under a precedent of 
fundamental limitations of rights, a slippery slope that’s been 
travelled far too often.124 
NBIs may face “death” before any chance at personhood. If 
NBIs are considered akin to traditional artificial persons, it is 
disconcerting is that many forms of artificial persons can be 
terminated via judicial order.125 Even dodging that metaphorical 
bullet might still leave NBIs in limbo, with death lurking at and 
defining a boundary of personhood—the UDDA would lead to a 
conclusion that without brain or respiratory function, a person 
is dead.126 The UDDA criteria used are fallible even when 
applied to humans (and more so with life-sustaining 
technologies); and are even more dubious when considered in 
regards to NBIs.127 Consider an emulated human brain, as 
several projects are researching, which should theoretically 
produce an intelligence identical to that of the source brain.128 
Circulatory, respiratory, and biological brain activity cannot be 
restored to such a system.129 Early NBIs may face danger in the 
                                                          
 120. Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with Recommendations to the 
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 5, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 
2016) (“[U]ltimately, robots’ autonomy raises the question of their nature in the 
light of the existing legal categories – of whether they should be regarded as 
natural persons, legal persons, animals or objects – or whether a new category 
should be created, with its own specific features and implications as regards the 
attribution of rights and duties.”). 
 121. Id.; see also Alex Hern, Give Robots ‘Personhood’ Status, EU Committee 
Argues, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology 
/2017/jan/12/give-robots-personhood-status-eu-committee-argues. 
 122. See, e.g., Person, supra note 75. 
 123. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra Subpart I.F.iii. 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. 
 128. See KURZWEIL, supra note 33, at 407. 
 129. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1980); supra text accompanying note 91 (noting that the UDDA uses the term 
individual, which functions in the status quo, but would be ambiguous in 
regards to NBIs). 
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earliest moments of conception, as Common Rule protections, 
the US baseline for research subjects, protect humans not 
persons.130 
Borrowing Justice Stewart’s standard, the “know-it-when-I-
see-it” approach, provides a path through this quagmire of 
imperfect terms.131 Although thoroughly ambiguous, the know-
it-when-I-see-it method allows for categorization when defining 
characteristics are uncertain.132 An entity will be readily 
discernable as a person (an NBI) or not (a machine).133 Douglas 
Hofstadter provides a demonstration of this concept through the 
lens of science fiction: 
Seeing C-3PO and R2-D2 “in flesh and blood” on the screen 
makes us realize that whenever we look at an entity made of 
metal or plastic, we are not inherently destined to jump 
reflexively to the dogmatic conclusion, “That thing is necessarily 
an inanimate object since it is made out of ‘the wrong stuff’.” 
Rather, we find, perhaps to our own surprise, that we are easily 
able to imagine a thinking, feeling entity made of cold, rigid, 
unfleshlike stuff.134 
Hofstadter follows this with the other extreme—the 
homogeneous and unexceptional battle droids, who are 
seemingly devoid of person.135 This phenomenon, the ubiquitous 
ability to casually navigate a concept which is beyond definition, 
appears intrinsic to humans and can be conscripted to formal 
use.136 Recognizing NBIs as something closer to human, rather 
than a mere machine, brings them closer to the realm of persons 
                                                          
 130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 131. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring); see also supra text accompanying note 88. 
 132. See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197; see also supra text accompanying note 
88. 
 133. There could be a third state, in which the intelligence is so foreign to 
humans, it is unrecognizable as such. Such a scenario poses a paradoxical state; 
learning of its existence would inherently collapse this conundrum to the 
dichotomy above. To put it another way, the state of an entity’s person is either 
determinable or humans cannot be aware of its existence. 
 134. See HOFSTADTER supra note 87, at 20. 
 135. Id. at 20 (“What is it, then, that gives us the undeniable sense that C-
3PO and R2-D2 have a “light on” inside . . . ? . . . [W]hat was it that was 
lacking . . . in that mass of identical blown-up soldier robots . . . ?”). 
 136. Even young children recognize some comradery with R2 and C-3PO. 
See Clive Thompson, Why Do We Love R2-D2 and Not C-3PO, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (May 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-do-we-
love-r2-d2-and-not-c-3po-180951176/. 
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and justifies a need for ethical considerations, including rights 
and protections. 
C. WHAT RIGHTS SHOULD APPLY TO A NON-BIOLOGICAL 
INTELLIGENCE? 
NBIs do not neatly fit the existing schema of which rights 
and duties should apply, which may be complicated by a 
mismatch of nonhuman physical form and human-like 
cognition.137 For ease of conceptualization, one might broadly 
divide NBIs into 1) constructs, AIs which are not a human 
analogue, and 2) reconstructions, replicas of human intelligence 
produced via simulation, emulation, or other methods.138 
Construct NBIs are completely alien to biological intelligences, 
but reconstructions help bridge that gap—they are essentially 
non-biological humans. Combining the ability to recognize NBIs 
as near-human and the nearly human nature of reconstructions 
provides an easy path to rationalize treatment of NBIs. 
Reconstructions represent a direct correlation to humans. 
Apart from the missing squishy bits, the intelligence should be 
identical to a human intelligence. Some reconstruction NBIs 
may even be exact copies of humans; digitized uploads in the 
same vein as ripping a CD. When the thinking entity is 
undisguisable from natural, biological human mental processes, 
is that sufficient to draw the line between person and not? Not 
that long ago, a similar question was posed when life support 
prolonged humans beyond previously fatal conditions (e.g. when 
a heart no longer beats without intervention or respiration is 
performed by a machine). Extrapolating such trends, it is 
historically congruous to accept persons not tied to physical 
characteristics. 
It would be improper to deny such entities human rights. An 
amputated limb does not lessen one’s personhood, nor does the 
capability to control one’s body (such as those who have 
neuromodulation implants to control motor dysfunctions). The 
position that rights depend on whether a mind exists on a 
computer or within an organic system would require one to 
assign some special characteristic to the information processing 
machinery. Such a stance will likely falter as technology blurs 
the boundary between man and machine, which can be 
                                                          
 137. See id; supra Subpart I.F.ii. 
 138. See supra Subpart I.F.ii. 
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envisioned as more advanced neuroprosthetics are developed. 
The only rights which might be subject to plausible argument for 
reasonable reduction would be those relating to corporeal form, 
which could be inapplicable to an entity that is not tied to a 
biological form. 
When considering construct NBIs, recognition of artificial 
persons can be utilized as foundation for some basic 
assumptions. Due Process and Equal Protection, even if limited 
in some regards, already apply to more than natural persons.139 
If organizational entities can exercise freedom of religion, it 
follows that other freedoms are not prohibited.140 Although the 
Supreme Court left the issue of Constitutional protections for 
artificial persons for another day, NBIs would present a stronger 
argument for recognition of such protections than mere 
organizations, being something recognizable as more than an 
inanimate object.141 
III. RECOMMENDATION 
A. EXPAND RESEARCH SUBJECT PROTECTIONS TO INCLUDE 
NBIS 
NBIs are not subject to explicit research subject 
protections.142 However, precursor technologies to NBIs are 
currently areas of significant research.143 This mismatch 
increases the likelihood that NBIs will be exposed to harm and 
suggests a need for preemptive action. Further, NBIs should be 
considered vulnerable populations and afforded the associated 
additional protections. 
                                                          
 139. Artificial Person, supra note 76 (“An entity is a person for purposes of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses but is not a citizen for purposes 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses in Article IV § 2 and in the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 140. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) 
(holding that a corporation is a person who is entitled to relief under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act if its free exercise of religion is burdened). 
 141. See id. at 2785 (declining to decide whether corporations have a First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion). 
 142. See generally supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting the 
Common Rule only applying to humans as an example of the lack of protections 
for NBIs in research settings). 
 143. Supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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The Common Rule, by its plain text, only applies to 
humans.144 Its underlying values and expansive nature, 
however, would indicate that it should be interpreted broadly.145 
The EU has recommended ethical principles in robotics and AI, 
similar to the Common Rule.146 Populations which should be 
regarded as vulnerable are not explicitly defined; they are 
characterized by a list of sample groups.147 Analogizing some of 
these categories to NBIs demonstrates some clear parallels. 
Early NBIs may initially exhibit limited faculties and 
knowledge; akin to children, mentally disabled persons, or 
educationally disadvantaged persons. Further NBIs would likely 
lack any means of departing from the research, similar to 
prisoners. NBIs appear to fit subject criteria for which the 
Common Rule would impose additional precautions, yet are 
likely wholly excluded as non-humans. 
By drafting a variant of the Common Rule to include 
potential forms of NBIs, necessary protections could be enacted 
so that risks to subject NBIs are minimized. The IRB model 
would provide oversight to research in areas that may be fertile 
ground for NBI emergence—brain simulation and emulation, 
machine and deep learning, attempts to create generalized AI, 
and so on.148 As with any research, any given result is 
unpredictable; whether data supporting a hypothesis, 
unexpected harm to subjects, or emergence of NBI. Through the 
use of IRBs, such uncertainty will be judged by a panel to weigh 
                                                          
 144. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2017). 
 145. See FAQ, supra note 103 (describing Common Rule core values of 
respect, beneficence, and justice). 
 146. See Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with Recommendations 
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 7, 2015/2103(INL) (May 
31, 2016) (proposing an ethical framework based on principles of beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and autonomy). The Committee also recommended ethics 
committees similar to IRBs. Id. at 17. 
 147. Id. (“When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to 
coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, 
mentally disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged 
persons, additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the 
rights and welfare of these subjects.”). Note the use of “persons” in the text here, 
as opposed to “humans” in other portions. 
 148. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (providing the criteria that would be 
applied in the NBI context). 
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potential outcomes and take precautions against unjust 
scenarios.149 
A pure copy of the Common Rule might not neatly apply to 
NBIs and need some minor adjustment. Informed consent would 
be a difficult proposition for NBIs—they may likely arise 
through the research to which consent would be needed.150 By 
implementing stronger safeguards, as the Common Rule 
mandates for vulnerable populations, this concern can be 
alleviated to allow research to continue.151 Further, informed 
consent should be sought immediately once a suspected NBI is 
involved and revisited as necessary to accommodate any advance 
in the NBI’s capacities.152 
Expanding the Common Rule to include NBIs is necessary 
to establish protections before undue harm occurs. Establishing 
a baseline modeled from human research will provide adequate 
protections for nascent NBIs and preserve their dignity as 
thinking beings. 
B. LIMITATIONS AND CONCERNS TO EXPANSION 
NBIs may not be readily accepted as legal or social equals.153 
For NBIs, science fiction may have already “poisoned the well” 
to some extent, wherein AI are predominantly villains.154 Public 
education and discussion of NBIs should be promoted, so that 
these issues are minimally subject to politicization. Even with 
                                                          
 149. See Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions - 
Information Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov 
/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126420.htm#IRBProcedures (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2017) (explaining that IRBs have the power to approve, modify 
or disapprove research). 
 150. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2016) (“Except as provided elsewhere 
in this policy, no investigator may involve a human being as a subject in 
research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally 
effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative.”). 
 151. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b). 
 152. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (explaining consent requirements). 
 153. See generally Ethan Fast and Eric Horvitz, Long-Term Trends in the 
Public Perception of Artificial Intelligence, 31 AAAI CONF. ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 963 (2017) (explaining that while humans do think positively 
about artificial intelligence, concerns regarding things like losing control are 
increasing and may contribute to human non-acceptance). 
 154. See supra notes 15, 54 and accompanying text (discussing negative 
portrayals of AI in science fiction, and the fact that most people’s exposure to 
AI is through science fiction, respectively). 
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favorable public opinion, the legal status of NBIs will likely be 
an uphill battle.155 
Opponents might argue that legally elevating NBI rights 
could increase the risk of harm to humans as a whole156 or lower 
human legal rights.157 Some will argue that animals would (or 
should) be included if rights are granted based on an adjusted 
personhood standard.158 Research continues to show that animal 
brains are more similar to human brains than previously 
considered and many “human” emotion functions occur in 
them.159 However, this again goes back to the “know-it-when-I-
see-it” method—even though there are similar characteristics, 
there is still something “missing.”160 Some groups might even 
view such a change to be detrimental, arguing that an 
“intelligence” based standard would disenfranchise mentally 
disabled persons. Much of this may be avoided by clearly 
denoting that NBIs are not biological entities. Others might see 
this as an opportunity to expand doctrine for current artificial 
persons, seeking greater protections for corporate entities. Here, 
noting that current artificial persons are legal fictions rather 
than discrete thinking entities would be key to articulating the 
differentiation. 
C. ENGAGE CRITICAL DISCUSSION AND THOUGHT REGARDING 
RIGHTS THAT MUST EXIST FOR NBIS 
Further consideration of NBI rights will be necessary upon 
emergence of such entities. Without a greater understanding of 
the form(s) which NBIs take, such rights remain pure 
                                                          
 155. See Joelle Renstrom, Should Robots Have Rights?, DAILY BEAST (May 
5, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/should-robots-have-rights 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (explaining that some people think robots are similar 
to slaves, “giving robots rights is dangerous because it puts human and robots 
on equal footing,” and robots should only be looked at as an extension of human 
abilities). 
 156. Supra notes 15–21 (noting the risk to humanity that some see from AI 
development). 
 157. See Renstrom, supra note 155. 
 158. See, e.g., Marc Bekoff, After 2,500 Studies, It’s Time to Declare Animal 
Sentience Proven (Op-Ed), LIVE SCI. (Sep. 6, 2013), http://www.livescience.com 
/39481-time-to-declare-animal-sentience.html; Animal Consciousness, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 24, 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries 
/consciousness-animal/. 
 159. See Redish, supra note 30 at 7. 
 160. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 87 (describing this throughout the work 
as “lights on, but nobody home”). 
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speculation. Uncertainty, however, is not reason enough to 
ignore the topic, and conversation should begin in advance of the 
need for law.161 As Alan Turing stated, “at the end of the 
[twentieth] century . . . one will be able to speak of machines 
thinking without expecting to be contradicted.”162 Nearly 
seventy years later (and beyond the referenced century), highly 
advanced algorithms function as digital assistants to everyday 
life—people regularly talk to machines.163 Yet thought of the 
next step, NBI, is often relegated to summer blockbusters.164 
There are several stepping stones (or hurdles, for the 
pessimists) in this path. Who is liable when an AI product, such 
as an autonomous vehicle, malfunctions?165 What happens when 
an AI’s actions would constitute a crime if performed by a 
person?166 How do AIs involved in law enforcement interact with 
the Fourth Amendment?167 The rapid onset and adoption of AI 
technologies breaks the mold of existing law and often outpaces 
the reactionary process of developing new law.168 
Every day, humanity is making rapid advances in machine 
learning; even creating programs which teach themselves.169 An 
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exact date for the emergence intelligent machines is 
unknowable, yet appears to be ever more proximate.170 There is 
no excuse to be caught off guard if (or when) such entities enter 
human society—specific guidance may not be completed, but it 
must at a minimum be contemplated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Humans may soon create entities who exhibit mental 
capacities equivalent to, or beyond, those of Homo sapiens.171 In 
anticipation of such beings, safeguards for NBIs should be 
preemptively integrated into research which may produce NBIs. 
Given current advancements in said research, it is time to 
implement an equivalent of the basic standard of protections in 
researching humans, to construct protections for NBIs.172 Such 
fundamental protections are merely the first steps in developing 
a doctrine of rights for NBIs, which should be evaluated on an 
ongoing basis in the coming years.  
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